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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HARMLESS ERROR-COERCED CONFES-
SION Is No LONGER GROUNDS FOR AUTOMATIC REVERSAL OF A TRIAL.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
On September 14, 1982, Oreste Fulminante reported to the Mesa
(Arizona) Police Department that his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Jene-
ane Hunt, was missing.' Jeneane was under his care while her mother,
Fulminante's wife, was in the hospital. 2 Jeneane's body was found two
days later in the desert east of Mesa. 3 She had two close-range, large
caliber gunshot wounds on each side of her head and an unidentifiable
strip of cloth or rope tied loosely around her neck.' Her body had de-
composed to the point that it was impossible to determine whether she
had been sexually molested. 5
Fulminante became a suspect in Jeneane's murder because his
statements concerning Jeneane's disappearance and his relationship
with her were inconsistent.6 He left Arizona for New Jersey after in-
vestigations failed to produce sufficient evidence to charge him with the
crime.' He was then convicted in New Jersey of an unrelated federal
1. Arizona v. Fulminate, Il1 S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Jeneane's mother testified at trial that the ligature looked like a piece of towel mate-
rial. Crime lab reports indicated that it could have been used for nonfatal choking. State v. Fulmi-
nante, 778 P.2d 602, 620 (Ariz. 1988).
5. 1II S. Ct. at 1250. Crime lab tests performed for sperm and semen were negative. This
finding was not unexpected considering how long the victim had been dead. 778 P.2d at 605.
6. 1I1 S. Ct. at 1250. Fulminante claimed that he had taught Jeneane how to use firearms
and that he had a good relationship with her. Jeneane's mother said that the two got along poorly
and that Fulminante had never taught Jeneane to use firearms. 778 P.2d at 606.
7. I1I S. Ct. at 1250. Circumstantial evidence included the fact that Fulminante was caring
for Jeneane when she disappeared, that motorcycle tracks were detected at the scene, and that she
was shot with a large caliber gun. It was undisputed that Fulminante owned a motorcycle. Police
discovered that Fulminante had purchased an extra barrel for his .357 revolver from a gun shop in
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crime and was incarcerated at the Ray Brook Federal Correctional In-
stitute in New York.
8
While at Ray Brook, Fulminante met Anthony Sarivola, an in-
mate with an organized crime background who had become a paid in-
formant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).9 After the two
became friends, Sarivola heard a rumor that Fulminante was suspected
of killing Jeneane.'0 Sarivola confronted him and the two discussed the
incident several times.1 Fulminante repeatedly denied any involve-
ment, but he told conflicting stories. 12 Sarivola told an FBI agent about
the rumor and about Fulminante's inconsistent accounts. 3 The agent
told Sarivola to find out more. 4
The other prisoners began to treat Fulminante roughly after the
rumor that he was a child killer became widespread. 5 Sarivola offered
to use his organized crime connections to put a stop to this activity, but
on one condition: that Fulminante tell him the truth about the mur-
der.1" This time Fulminante said that he did kill Jeneane.17 He did not
stop with a bare admission; he gave vivid details, expressing dislike for
the girl.18 He told Sarivola that he took Jeneane to the desert; where he
had sexually molested her, choked her, made her get down on her knees
Mesa the day before Jeneane disappeared. 778 P.2d at 606.
8. 11I S. Ct. at 1250. After the police learned of the gun purchase in Mesa, they discov-
ered that Fulminante had a prior criminal record, including the felony of impairing the morals of
a child. On October 28, 1982, he was arrested in New Jersey for possession of firearms by a felon.
He was convicted and served a sentence in the federal prison in Springfield, Missouri. After he
was released from Springfield, he was arrested on yet another firearms charge for which he was




12. 111 S. Ct. at 1250. For example, once he said that Jeneane had been killed by bikers
looking for drugs, and later he said he did not know what had happened to her. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Sarivola testified at trial that he believed Fulminante's life was in danger; stating
that Fulminante would "have went out of prison horizontally." I 1l S. Ct. at 1262 (quoting App.
28).
16. Ill S. Ct. at 1250. The conversation took place one evening in October 1983, as
Sarivola and Fulminante walked around the prison track. Sarivola told Fulminante that he knew
Fulminante was getting some rough treatment from the other prisoners. He volunteered his pro-
tection but told Fulminante, "You have to tell me about it, you know, for me to give you any
help." Id. (quoting App. 83).
17. Id.
18. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d at 621-22. Fulminante told Sarivola he "hated" Jeneane,
calling her a "little fucking bitch." He described making her perform oral sex, torturing her,
choking her, and making her beg. Id.
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and beg for her life, and then shot her twice in the head. 19
After his release from Ray Brook in May 1984, Fulminante made
a second confession to Sarivola's fiance, Donna.2" He again described
the crime in graphic detail, making lewd and obscene references to
Jeneane and expressing hatred and disgust for her.21
On September 4, 1984, Fulminante was indicted in Arizona for
Jeneane's murder.22 Before trial, he moved to suppress both confes-
sions, alleging that his confession to Sarivola was coerced and that his
confession to Donna was "fruit of the poisonous tree."23 The trial court
found both confessions voluntary and denied the motion.24 Both confes-
sions were introduced at trial. Fulminante was convicted and sentenced
to death.25
Fulminante's appeal alleged that the confessions were coerced,26
and that their admission at trial violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law2 7 and his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. 2 The Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the first
confession was coerced, but originally held that its admission at trial
was harmless error.29 Upon motion for reconsideration, the court deter-
19. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
20. Id. Donna and Sarivola picked up Fulminante at the bus terminal after he was released
from prison. When Donna asked him if he had friends or relatives he wished to see, he told her
that he could not go back to his home in Arizona because he had killed his stepdaughter there.
778 P.2d at 606.
21. 778 P.2d at 621-22. His statements to Donna were similar to those made to Sarivola.
He made another pronouncement of ill will toward the girl, and told Donna, "I want to go piss on
[Jeneane's] grave." Id.
22. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
23. Id. at 1250-51. Otherwise admissible evidence can be "fruit of the poisonous tree" if
illegally obtained evidence led to its discovery. If the evidence is directly attributable to the illegal
information, then it is inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
24. II1 S. Ct. at 1251.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
28. US CoNsT. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
29. 778 P.2d at 609-11. Confessions are considered prima facie involuntary in Arizona. The
state bears the burden of proof that the confession was voluntarily given. For the findings of the
trial court to withstand appellate review, the trial record must contain sufficient evidence that the
state carried its burden of proof. At Fulminante's trial, the state argued that Fulminante's confes-
sion was voluntary for the following reasons: (I) that he did not express fear of the other prison-
ers; (2) that he did not seek Sarivola's protection; and (3) that he made the statement in the
course of a casual conversation. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that this was "insufficient to
create a prima facie establishment of voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence." It held
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mined that United States Supreme Court precedent precluded harmless
error analysis for coerced confessions."0 The Arizona Supreme Court
then ordered that Fulminante be retried without the use of the first
confession."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of differing views
in the state and federal courts over whether the admission at trial of a
coerced confession is subject to a harmless-error analysis."32 The Court
that the trial court erred in allowing the confession to be presented to the jury. Id. at 609.
The court upheld the conviction, however, because it determined that the error was harmless.
It held that the confession to Donna-which was admissible-established Fulminante's guilt. It
found that circumstantial evidence corroborated the confession to Donna; therefore, the jury
would have had the same evidence to convict Fulminante without the confession to Sarivola. Id. at
610-1I. See also supra notes 7, 20, 21 and accompanying text.
30. 111 S. Ct. at 1251. Fulminante asserted in his motion for reconsideration that the
court's harmless error analysis erroneously relied upon cases that involved violation of Miranda
rights. 778 P.2d at 626. These rights include those that come under the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. Fifth Amendment protections have been defined as the right of the accused to be in-
formed that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against
him in court, and that he has a right to counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Fulminante argued that the court should have looked to cases involving violations of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination by physical or mental coercion. He contended that
while harmless error may apply to confessions obtained in the absence of counsel, it clearly did not
apply to those that were obtained by physical or mental coercion.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed that "there is an unbro-
ken line of authority supporting the rule that although a receipt of a confession obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda may be harmless, the harmless error doctrine does not apply to coerced confes-
sions." 161, 778 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
Of the precedents cited in the supplemental opinion, three plainly stated that the harmless
error analysis does not apply to coerced confessions. They are Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
398 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
568 (1954). 778 P.2d at 627.
31. 111 S. Ct. at 1251. Having determined that the confession to Donna was not "fruit of
the poisonous tree," the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that it could be introduced at retrial.
The court made this determination because of the length of time between the two statements,
because it happened during casual conversation, and because it took place when Fulminante no
longer needed Sarivola's protection. 778 P.2d at 611. The court adhered to this decision upon
motion for reconsideration. 778 P.2d at 627. This determination was not challenged upon appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. Ill S. Ct. 1251, n.1.
32. 111 S. Ct. at 1251. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for cases holding that a
coerced confession can never be harmless error. But see United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487
(8th Cir. 1986) (harmless error to admit defendant's statement that was made when he was mis-
led into thinking he was being questioned for assault when he was actually being questioned for
murder); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323, 325 (4th Cir. 1971) (voluntariness of confession was dis-
puted in the record, but its admission was harmless error); Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 928
(2d Cir. 1970) (confession taken while the defendant was experiencing withdrawal symptoms in-
voluntary, but its admission at trial was harmless error because he made a second confession that
was corroborated by evidence and covered every element of the crime). For state court decisions in
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held that the confession was coerced,33 that coerced confessions were
subject to harmless error analysis, 34 and that, in this case, the error was
not harmless.3 5 Oreste Fulminante will be retried in Arizona for Jene-
ane Hunt's murder without the use of his confession to Anthony
Sarivola.36 Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
At early English common law, confessions were admitted at trial
no matter how they were obtained. 7 Voluntariness was never an issue;
even confessions extracted by torture were presented without ques-
tion. 38 The law began to change late in the eighteenth century.39 The
principle emerged that confessions prompted by "improper induce-
ments," whether threat or promise, were unreliable and should be ex-
cluded from trial.4
The early American Supreme Court followed this lead, basing its
rules of evidence on this English inducement doctrine. 1 In the late
nineteenth century the Court forged a new direction, establishing a
accord, see State v. Castaneda, 724 P.2d 1, 6 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Gibson, 440 N.E.2d 339 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982); People v. Ferkins, 497 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); (all holding that
admission of involuntary confessions harmless error because of the cumulative nature of the
statements).
See also Stauffer v. United States, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986) ("The Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed the issue of whether admission of an involuntary confession may be harmless
error since its landmark decision in [Chapman v. California] that a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless.").
33. 111 S. Ct. at 1252.
34. Id. at 1265.
35. Id. at 1258.
36. Id. at 1261.
37. 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818 at 292 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). See also
Note, Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV L. REV. 935, 954 (1966) [hereinafter
Note].
38. See E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14-
16, 18 (1949).
39. Id.
40. I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at
439-40 (Criminal Practice Series 1984) [hereinafter LAFAVE]. For an overview of the develop-
ment of the law of confessions from early England to modern America see WIGMORE, supra note
37, §§ 817-26.
41. E.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). The Court said the presumption that a
statement is reliable is removed
[wihen the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements
• .. held out by one in authority ...because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in
reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to
make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id. at 585.
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constitutional standard for admitting confessions in the federal courts.42
This new standard was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.4 The determinative question was whether
the confession had been voluntarily made."' "Improper inducement"
was a factor in this determination rather than the test itself.4
The Supreme Court's first review of a confession used in a state
court was the 1936 case Brown v. Mississippi. 4" Because stare decisis
at that time prohibited application of the Fifth Amendment to the
states,4 7 the Court adopted a different standard. The Court in Brown
declared that confessions made as a result of physical torture were
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.48 Physically forcing a confession was viewed as a violation of the
basic standards of fairness implied by the Due Process Clause. 4" In
subsequent cases, the Court expanded its definition of due process vio-
lations, including such variables as psychological coercion 50 and fear of
harm from outside sources.51
42. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
43. Id. at 542.
44. See Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 3 (1924).
45. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT at 10-30
(1973). See also LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 6.2, at 441.
46. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
47. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The Court in Twining rejected apply-
ing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at 99-100. Twining was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964). The Fifth Amendment is now a basis for excluding coerced confessions in state
courts. 378 U.S. at 3. See also DAVID M. NISSMAN ET AL., LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 2:13, at 55-56
(1985) [hereinafter NISSMAN].
48. 297 U.S. at 285-86. The Court distinguished compulsion by,torture from compulsion to
testify as a witness. It held that the state was limited in its freedom to establish its criminal
procedure policies by the federal constitutional requirement of due process of law. Id. at 285.
49. Id. at 286-87. The defendants in Brown were repeatedly hung to a tree until they be-
came choked, then stripped and beaten with a belt buckle. Id. at 281-82. The Court noted that
"the transcript reads more like pages torn from some medieval account, than a record made
within the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional govern-
ment." Id. at 282. It stated that "it would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the
sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due pro-
cess." Id. at 286.
50. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) ("[C]oercion can be mental
as well as physical, and . . . the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitu-
tional inquisition."); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confession coerced when obtained
after persistent interrogation during a week of incommunicado detention, ending with an all-night
examination producing the incriminating statements).
51. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (confession coerced when police of-
fered to protect the defendant from an angry mob outside the jailhouse door if he would confess).
542
1992] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Today the issue of voluntariness is a question of federal law, re-
quiring the Supreme Court to make an independent evaluation of the
record.52 The admissibility of the confession is judged by the "totality
of the circumstances."53 The conduct of the state official, the circum-
stances of the interrogation, and the effect on the particular person are
weighed together.54 Determination is on a case-by-case basis. 55
Modern cases reflect shifting emphases. 6 Some opinions have fo-
cused on whether or not the government official acted improperly in
obtaining the confession.57 Others have focused almost exclusively on
whether or not the accused had the requisite state of mind to freely
confess. 58 The 1986 Supreme Court decision, Colorado v. Connelly,5"
seems to have put to rest any question that a lack of free will alone can
render a confession involuntary. While free will is a "significant fac-
52. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
53. I11 S. Ct. at 1251-52. See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961);
NISSMAN, supra note 47, § 1:9, at 17-18.
54. See LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 6.2(c), at 444-49.
55. Id.
56. See Note, supra note 37, at 962-63 "[Tihe Court has encountered great difficulties in
deciding just what process is due at interrogation . . . The vacuum has been filled by a great
variety of attempts by lower federal courts, state supreme courts, and commentators to state the
requirement of due process in this context."). See also Michael E. Gehring, Note, Colorado v.
Connelly: The Demise of Free Will as an Independent Basis for Finding a Confession Involun-
tary, 33 VILL. L. REv. 895 (1988), concluding that the confusion resulted from ambiguous lan-
guage in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). In Blackburn the Court held that an
insane person's confession was inadmissible. It concluded that our law enforcement system should
not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this condition. It did not specify whether a lack
of rational volition alone could render a confession inadmissible, or if the existence of police bru-
tality is necessary. Subsequent decisions interpreted Blackburn to mean that the mere absence of
free will could render a confession inadmissible. See infra note 58.
57. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (When such outrageous conduct
is present, "there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the victim."); Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (police did not use or threaten violence and provided prisoner
with basic comforts which were factors considered in finding the confession voluntary). See also
Gehring, supra note 56, at 905 nn. 52-53; NISSMAN, supra note 47, § 1:10, at 18-20 (collecting
cases).
58. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 (1963) ("[ln Blackburn ... we held irrele-
vant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on the part of the questioning officers."). See
Gehring, supra note 56, at 905 n.51. See NISSMAN, supra note 47, § 1:10.
59. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). The defendant in Connelly approached a police officer, waived his
Miranda rights, and confessed to a murder. While in custody, the defendant became confused and
told police that "voices" had told him to come to Denver and confess. It was later discovered that
he was a chronic schizophrenic and was in a psychotic episode at the time of the confession. The
Colorado Supreme Court, relying on Townsend v. Sain, ruled the confession involuntary because
it was not a produce of unfettered free will. Id. at 160-61. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a lack of free will alone does not render a confession involuntary. Police misconduct must be
present. Id. at 164, 167.
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tor," the Court declared in Connelly that police misconduct is a "nec-
essary predicate" for a finding of coercion.6 0
The early English courts that were so lenient in admitting coerced
confessions were extremely strict in excluding anything that was con-
sidered an error. 61 These courts followed the Exchequer rule of appel-
late review which presumed that any erroneously admitted evidence
was prejudicial and required automatic reversal if error was found.6 2
Not even the smallest errors escaped scrutiny. 63 Retrials were the rule
rather than the exception, and litigation "seemed to survive until the
parties expired. 64
The early American courts adopted the Exchequer rule and ad-
hered to it even after the English courts abolished it.65 The Americans
applied the Exchequer rule to an even broader range of errors than did
their English ancestors.66 Retrials were ordered for extremely trivial
matters; for example, one case was reversed because the word "the"
was omitted before the words "peace and dignity" in an indictment. 67
Cases were often tried several times over technical errors.6 Thus,
American appellate courts were criticized as "impregnable citadels of
technicality."6 9 Reform began early in the twentieth century as states
enacted harmless error legislation. 70 Today every state in the Union has
its own harmless error statute or rule. 71
Two lines of error analysis have developed from these statutes. 72
These lines evolved to address the type of right violated by the error.73
60. Id.
61. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980); LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257.
62. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257. See also WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 21, at
367; ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 5-12 (1970).
63. See Goldberg, supra note 61, at 422; LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257.
64. Goldberg, supra note 61, at 422.
65. See LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257. See also WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 21,
at 888.
66. See LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257. See also Goldberg, supra note 61, at
422.
67. State v. Campbell, 109 S.W. 706 (Mo. 1908).
68. Goldberg, supra note 61, at 422; TRAYNOR, supra note 62, at 13-17.
69. Hon. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by
Exercise of Judicial Power, I I A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925).
70. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 257-58.
71. See Goldberg, supra note 61, at 422. See also LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at
258; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).




If the error is committed within the judicial process itself, the error is
analyzed according to the substance of the right.74 The question is
whether the error deprived the defendant of the protection inherent in
the substantive right.7 5 If the answer is "no," the error is considered a
mere technicality. 76 These "structure of the proceeding" errors, some-
times called structural defects, include such errors as improper venue, 77
a biased judge, 78 and the deprivation of right to counsel. 79 These errors
are usually not framed as harmless error issues."0
The second category of errors occurs during the presentation of
evidence to the jury." The development of harmless error tests for evi-
dence-related errors has been described as a "wayward course,"82
marked by "twisting and turning, '8 3 "innovation and regression, insta-
bility and uncertainty." 84 Its history is probably most easily traced by
looking at the evolution of the tests used, rather than at the cases.
The most prevalent test early in this century was the "correct re-
sult" test.8 5 This test asks whether, after considering the admissible evi-
dence, the jury's verdict is clearly correct. 86 The rationale of the "cor-
rect result" test is that there is no harm done if the defendant would
have been convicted anyway.8 7 Critics complained that the test sup-
planted the role of the jury. 8 The Supreme Court eventually agreed,
74. See, e.g., Long v. State, 141 N.E. 691, 692 (Ohio 1923) (applying a state statute pro-
viding that "[a] new trial, after a verdict of conviction, may be granted on the application of the
defendant for . . . causes affecting materially his substantial rights").
75. See Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 707 (Va. 1922) (unnecessary resummoning
of the same jurors on a new venire after motion to quash for irregularities in the writs is harmless
error. The court stated that the defendant might have been prejudiced if venire had been quashed
for grounds affecting the competency of the jurors). Id. at 709-10. See also Traynor, supra note
62, at 57.
76. See People v. Moore, 221 P. 225 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (excusing juror without
grounds did not affect defendant's right to a fair trial).
77. See, e.g., Stapleton v. State, 565 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 393 A.2d. 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1928).
78. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6 at 88-89 (Supp. 1991).
79. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 259-60.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 260.
82. TRAYNOR, supra note 62, at 13.
83. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(a), at 261.
84. Stephen A. Saltzberg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 998 (1973).
85. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(b), at 262; TRAYNOR, supra note 62, at 18-22.
86. TRAYNOR, supra note 62, at 18-22; LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(b), at 262.
87. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(b), at 262.
88. Id.
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rejecting this test in Kotteakos v. United States.89 The Court stated "it
is not the appellate court's function to determine guilt or innocence
... .Those judgments are exclusively for the jury ... ."9o Therefore,
the Court opted for an "effect on the judgment test."91 The proper
question would not be whether the jury was
right in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the
verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be
taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the
impact of the thing done wrong in the minds of other men, not in
one's own mind, in the total setting.92
Until the 1960's, there was only one certainty in the harmless er-
ror doctrine. It did not apply to constitutional violations.9 . A constitu-
tional violation carried a presumption of prejudice and mandated auto-
matic reversal. 94 In 1963 Fahy v. Connecticut" foreshadowed a change
that was to come four years later. Fahy involved an unconstitutional
search. 96 Though the Court did not reach the harmless error issue, in
dicta it indicated a possible future application." The dissenters went a
step further and declared that the doctrine should apply. 98
The landmark decision of Chapman v. California9" expanded the
reasoning of Fahy and removed the traditional exemption from consti-
tutional violations. 100 The Court applied a test which was an extended
89. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
90. Id. at 763.
91. Id. at 766. See also LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(b), at 262.
92. 328 U.S. at 764.
93. See Robert W. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in
Federal Courts, 3 VILL. L. REv. 48, 67 (1957). See also Goldberg, supra note 61, at 423; TRAY-
NOR, supra note 62, at 55; LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(c), at 270.
94. LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 26.6(c), at 270. See generally Goldberg, supra note 61.
95. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
96. Id. at 86.
97. Id. See also LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(e), at 278-79.
98. 375 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
100. Compare Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24 with Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. at 86-87.
The Chapman case generated strong criticism. Critics said that the application of harmless
error to constitutional violations insidiously usurped basic constitutional guarantees. See Goldberg,
supra note 61, at 433. Goldberg called the test a "constitutional sneak thief." Id. at 421. He
contended that "[tihe doctrine has created appellate factfinding which denies the constitutionally
guaranteed right to trial by jury [and] erodes constitutional principles at all levels of the criminal
justice system from prosecution to Supreme Court review without ever affording an opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of the principle eroded." Id. at 427. He maintained that we pay a
"terrible symbolic price" by allowing the courts, traditionally guardians of constitutional rights, to
declare such violations harmless. Id. at 442.
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version of the Kotteakos "effect on the judgment" test.' The Chap-
man analysis divided constitutional violations into two catego-
ries-those that can be analyzed for harmless error and those that can-
not. 102 If the violation falls into the second category, reversal is
automatic.'03 If not, the question is whether, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the error influenced the verdict.0 4Chapman did not provide a bright-line rule or an exhaustive list
for the automatic reversal category. Three errors were cited as exam-
ples of those that could never be harmless.'05 They were deprivation of
counsel throughout a trial, 06 impartial judge,'017 and coerced confes-
sions. 10 The first two errors fell within the "structural defect" cate-
gory' 09 but a coerced confession constituted an evidential error.' °
Though evidential errors are usually considered conducive to harmless
error analysis, it is generally assumed that the Court in Chapman put
coerced confessions in the automatic reversal category because of the
extraordinary impact a confession has on the outcome of a trial."'
In Milton v. Wainwright"' the Court declared a confession ob-
tained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was harm-
less error. Seeds of uncertainty grew as judges debated whether all con-
fessions could now be analyzed for harmless error or whether the
constitutional right violated provided a distinction." 3
It was in response to this uncertainty that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari for Arizona v. Fulminante."4 The Court took a novel
approach in deciding this case. Rather than ruling on the single issue of
whether Fulminante's conviction should be reversed, the Court ap-
proached the decision as the resolution of three issues. These issues
101. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(b)(c), at 263-72.
102. 386 U.S. at 22-23. See also WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 863 n.1; Goldberg, supra note
61, at 425.
103. 386 U.S. at 22-23.
104. Id. at 24. See also LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 26.6(b), at 262.
105. 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
106. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
107. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
108. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
109. 11 S. Ct. at 1260.
110. See LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(d), at 276-77.
1II. Id. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 863.
112. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
113. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 26.6(e), at 280-81; see also WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 863,
at 632-34 n. 1. Compare Fulminante 778 P.2d at 626-27 with 778 P.2d at 628-29. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
114. 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
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were: (1) whether Fulminante's confession was coerced; (2) whether
harmless error applies to coerced confessions; and if so (3) whether the
admission of Fulminante's confession at trial was harmless error. The
issues were considered separately, with different coalitions forming a
majority for each.1 15 The Court ultimately held that Fulminante's con-
fession was coerced," 6 that harmless error does apply to coerced con-
fessions, 117 and that the error in this case was not harmless.118
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court on the coercion
issue.119 Applying the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court
focused on the following facts: (1) Fulminante was in danger of physi-
cal harm from the other inmates; (2) Sarivola was aware of the rough
treatment Fulminante was getting; (3) Sarivola used this knowledge
when he offered to protect Fulminante if he would tell the truth; and
(4) Fulminante confessed in response to this offer. 20 The Court deter-
mined that "a credible threat of violence is sufficient" and that "coer-
cion can be mental as well as physical."'' Drawing an analogy to
Payne v. Arkansas, 22 the Court illustrated how coercion is found when
this threat comes from outside sources and the government agent uses
it to prompt a confession. 2 3 The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion in Payne, finding that the defendant had confessed because he
115. Id. at 1249. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall, and Scalia formed the ma-
jority on the issue of coercion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Kennedy, and Scalia, were the majority on the application of harmless error to coerced confes-
sions. The Justices who found coercion, joined by Justice Kennedy, applied the Chapman harmless
error test to the case, and found the error not harmless. Id. Though they were ultimately put to
the task of applying the Chapman test, four of these Justices (Justices White, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens) actually voted against the application of harmless error to coerced confession.
They filed a vigorous dissent on this issue. Id. at 1253-57.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy dissented on the issue of
coercion. Joined by Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor further asserted that
even if the confession were coerced, its admission was harmless error. Id. at 1261-63, 1266.
Justice Souter voted only on the application of harmless error to coerced confessions. He did
not join either opinion on coercion or on the application of harmless error to this case. Id. at 1249,
1261.
116. 111 S. Ct. at 1252.
117. Id. at 1266.
118. Id. at 1261.
119. Id. at 1250.
120. Id. at 1252-53.
121. Id. at 1253.
122. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
123. 111 S. Ct. at 1253. In Payne, a policeman told the murder suspect (Payne) that there
were 30 or 40 folks outside the jailhouse door. If Payne would confess, the policeman said, he
might be able to help. Payne confessed and the confession was admitted at trial. He was convicted
and sentenced to death. 356 U.S. 560, 565 n.10.
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feared that he would be harmed by the mob without a conditional offer
of police protection. 24  Though the policeman himself had not
threatened the defendant, he had nevertheless forced the confession by
using a threatening situation to prompt the statement. 25 Therefore, the
defendant's confession was coerced and should not have been admitted
at trial. 2 ' Like the policeman in Payne, the Court said, Sarivola
manipulated the confession from Fulminante, playing upon Fulmi-
nante's fear of the other prisoners. 2 7 Sarivola used his offer of protec-
tion to prompt Fulminante to confess.' 28 Therefore, Fulminante's will
was overborne in a way similar to coercion in Payne.
28
Chief Justice Rehnquist pronounced for the Court that harmless
error analysis applies to coerced confessions. 30 The Court emphasized
that a coerced confession is an evidential error.' 31 It stressed the tradi-
tional distinction between evidential errors and the structural defect er-
rors-that evidential errors can be weighed with the other evidence to
determine harmlessness while structural defect errors cannot.3 2 Fur-
ther, the Court pointed out that the test had already been used in ear-
lier cases for confessions violating the Sixth Amendment. 33 Therefore,
it saw no reason for treating a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion differently from a Sixth Amendment violation. 34 It stated that all
of these carry potential for equally serious government misconduct, and
all have the same evidentiary impact. 3 5 The Court concluded that "[i]t
is thus impossible to create a meaningful distinction between confes-
sions elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment and those in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment."'1
36
The Court dismissed Chapman's reference to Payne as dicta, call-
124. 356 U.S. at 567-69.
125. Id. at 566.
126. Id. at 568.
127. 111 S. Ct. at 1253.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1263.
131. Id. at 1265.
132. Id.
133. Id. The case relied on by the Court, Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972),
contained facts very similar to Fulminante. The defendant made one confession to an undercover
policeman in the absence of counsel after his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached, and
the confession was admitted at trial. He also made three other confessions, however, before the
right had attached. 407 U.S. at 373-75.





ing it an historical reference in a footnote. 137 It further emphasized
that Payne was a pre-Chapman decision, rejecting a more lenient test
than that in Chapman.18 Thus, the Court did not view Fulminante as
a reversal of precedent.1 3 9 It acknowledged the potential evidentiary
impact of confessions but rejected this as a reason for eschewing the
harmless error test.1" 0 The Court asserted that.the test could be self-
regulating; if a confession proved "devastating to a defendant . . . a
reviewing court will conclude in such a case that its admission was not
harmless error. ''141
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court determining that the
admission of Fulminante's confession was not harmless error.142 Using
the Chapman test, the Court examined the evidence against Fulmi-
nante without the confession to Sarivola. 43 It found that the circum-
stantial evidence available would not have enabled the State to prose-
cute Fulminate.144 Examining the confession to Donna, it discovered
elements that could render the confession less credible if presented
alone. 14 5 The Court concluded that admission of the first confession
could have led to the admission of other evidence prejudicial to Fulmi-
nante and that the confession affected the sentencing phase of the
trial.' 46 Therefore, the error was not harmless and Fulminante should
137. Id. at 1264-65,
138. Id. at 1264.
139. Id. at 1264-65.
140. Id. at 1266.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1257.
143. Id. at 1257-58.
144. Id. at 1258.
145. Id. at 1258-59. These elements included: (I) Donna and Fulminante had just met
when he confessed to her; the jury might find this fact questionable without knowing of the prior
confession to Sarivola; (2) Donna did not report the confession to authorities; in fact, Sarivola did
not report it until over a year later; (3) Donna said that Fulminante "disgusted" her, yet she took
a second trip with him; (4) some of the details of the second confession were not corroborated by
evidence; (5) other details were only corroborated by the first confession; and (6) the jury might
think that Donna had a motive to lie, since Sarivola received government benefits for this informa-
tion and because both she and Sarivola were eventually placed in the federal Witness Protection
Program. Id.
146. Id. at 1260. The admissibility of aggravating circumstances was governed by the rules
of evidence applicable to criminal trials, The judge's finding that the murder was heinous, cruel,
and depraved beyond a reasonable doubt was based on evidence that could only be found in the
two confessions. He relied heavily on Fulminante's statement that Fulminante had made Jeneane
beg for her life. He stated that Fulminante's vulgar references to Jeneane and his vivid description
of the murder depicted "a man who was bragging and relishing the crime." The Court concluded
that the trial judge could not have reached these conclusions without the confession, therefore the
confession affected the sentencing phase of the trial. Id.
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be retried without the confession to Sarivola.147
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the dissenters on the coercion
issue. 14 8 In this dissent, "totality of the circumstances" test found a
different focus. The Chief Justice stressed the following facts: (1)
Fulminante stipulated that he was not afraid of the other inmates and
he did not seek Sarivola's protection; (2) Fulminante did not know that
Sarivola was an FBI agent; thus there was no intimidating official in-
terrogation; (3) Fulminante was free at all times to leave Sarivola's
company; (4) Sarivola only asked for the truth; he did not threaten
Fulminante or demand a confession; and (5) Fulminante had been in
prison before and could presumably protect himself. 49 The Chief Jus-
tice found no fault in Sarivola's conduct; he did not believe that
Sarivola intimidated Fulminante. 5 ° Therefore, the confession was not
coerced.1 51 The Chief Justice also stated in his dissent that even if the
confession was coerced, its admission at trial was harmless error." 2 He
agreed with the harmless error analysis of the Arizona Supreme Court
in its first opinion.153
Justice White wrote for the dissenters on the application of harm-
less error.1 5 4 He argued that the majority's decision to apply the doc-
trine reversed well-established precedent and subverted basic constitu-
tional protections.' 55 He adhered to the traditional view that the
potential impact of a confession on the outcome of a trial should keep a
confession that is erroneously obtained in the automatic reversal
category.156
The way Fulminante was decided may provoke as much debate as
147. Id. at 1261.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1262-63.
150. Id. at 1262.
151. Id. at 1261-63.
152. Id. at 1261.
153. Id. at 1266.
154. Id. at 1253.
155. Id. at 1257.
156. Id. at 1255. Justice White strongly disagreed with the Chief Justice that there is no
meaningful distinction between confessions violating the Sixth Amendment and those violating the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. He pointed out that a confession violating the Sixth Amend-
ment is not necessarily a coerced confession in the same sense as one violating the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendment. He contended that there is a difference between a confession from a person
who has been physically or mentally forced or intimidated into admitting guilt; and one from a
person who is merely deprived of counsel. He asserted that the underlying values of the constitu-
tional protections inherent in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment are compromised when the
penalty for violating them is lowered to the level of a harmless error. Id. at 1256.
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its result. The issue-focused approach 57 the Court used could be per-
ceived as judicial activism or overreaching. 58 This approach may well
be a trend. Two other recent cases decided before Fulminante also de-
parted from traditional structure in order to reach issues. In 1989 the
Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas"5 9 asked a question of statutory
interpretation which if answered in the affirmative would lead to a
broader constitutional question.' 60 The Court decided both issues,''
with those Justices who answered the statutory question in the negative
nevertheless reaching the broad constitutional question.6 2 The signifi-
cance of Union Gas as stare decisis cannot be overlooked. Justice
White cited that case as authority for his coalition to reach the issue of
the application of harmless error to Fulminante's conviction even
though they had voted against applying the doctrine to coerced
confessions.165
In 1988 Honig v. Doe' illustrated another slant on the Court's
willingness to reach for issues. In Honig the Justices hotly debated
whether they could pass the threshold issue of mootness to reach the
merits of the case.' 65 The Court did reach the merits, with the dissent
accusing the majority of relaxing the traditional mootness doctrine.' 66
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist boldly declared that
the doctrine should be relaxed or even abandoned, to enable the Court
to reach more issues and to provide clearer guidelines to lower
courts. 167
157. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
158. A former clerk for Justice Stevens labelled the issue-focused process used to decide
Fulminante as "vote cycling." He argued that it has a "peculiar abstract quality" that leads to
-perverse results." Liman, "Fulminante': Vote Cycling and the Court, 205 N.Y.L.J. 2, col. 2 (April
3, 1991). Liman asserted that Fulminante's conviction would not have been reversed had the case
been framed merely as whether his conviction should be reversed. Id. at col. 1.
159. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
160. Id. at 5. The questions presented were: (1) whether the purpose of the statute was to
abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and (2) whether Congress had the power to
do so under the Commerce Clause.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 45, 57.
163. 1II S. Ct. at 1257. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
165. Id. at 317-23, 338-42.
166. Id. at 336.
167. Id. at 330. The Chief Justice stated that he wrote separately to express his desire to
reconsider the doctrine of mootness. He said,
[t]o me the unique and valuable ability of this Court to decide a case-we are, at
present, the only Article II court which can decide a question in such a way to bind all
other courts-is a sufficient reason either to abandon the doctrine of mootness alto-
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The Court used a similar rationale in framing Fulminante as the
resolution of issues. It sought to resolve uncertainties in the state and
federal courts concerning the harmless error doctrine and coerced
confessions.16 8
Fulminante does provide answers, both implicitly and explicitly.
First, the definition of coercion has probably been construed as liberally
as the current Court will construe it. Justice White prefaced his opin-
ion with "the question is a close one. '"169 Chief Justice Rehnquist com-
plained bitterly in dissent that "[i]n concluding on these facts that
Fulminante's confession was involuntary, the Court today embraces a
more expansive definition of that term than is warranted by any of our
decided cases. ' 170 As Colorado v. Connelly17 1 marked the end of free
will as an independent determination for coercion, so Fulminante
marks the minimum standard for finding coercive government conduct.
Furthermore, Connelly did not inject as much objectivity into the
"totality of the circumstances" test as many had hoped. Though Con-
nelly requires that government misconduct be present to find coercion,
Fulminante illustrates that the test is still highly subjective. The differ-
ences are subtle, but close examination reveals that the majority's main
concern was Fulminante's weakness, 72 and the dissent's main concern
was Sarivola's conduct.1 73 The shifting emphasis which was observed
among courts before Connelly 74 still remains, even within one court on
one case. The "totality of the circumstances" test, being fact-based,
will probably always carry the potential of producing as many view-
points per case as there are judges deciding the case. An objective focus
within this type of test may be an elusive goal.
Nevertheless, Fulminante did accomplish its main goal. It settles
gether in cases which this Court has decided to review, or at least to relax the doctrine
of mootness in such a way as the dissent has accused the majority of doing here.
Id. at 332.
168. 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
169. Id. at 1252.
170. Id. at 1263.
171. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
172. 111 S. Ct. at 1252-53. The majority emphasized the elements of mental coercion, cit-
ing several cases that had found confessions involuntary on these grounds. In addition to their
heavy reliance on an analogy to Payne, they quoted Blackburn v. Alabama and cited several
famous cases on mental coercion. Id. at 1253.
173. Id. at 1261. The dissent's only references to Fulminante's state of mind were that he
had stipulated that he was not afraid and that he had been in prison before. Id. at 1262-63
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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uncertainties about the application of harmless error to coerced confes-
sions. It provides further guidance with a clear illustration of the Chap-
man test. This test, if properly applied, does not stop at the existence of
untainted evidence against a defendant. The majority did not stop there
in Fulminante. They considered how this evidence would look to the
jury without the tainted confession. 175 This portion of the case should
provide practical guidance for future decisions.
The troubling aspects of this case are the questions that it raises.
Will police now feel free to force information out of suspects since co-
ercion is no longer grounds for automatic reversal? Fulminate is al-
ready being regarded as a dangerous deregulation of police power. 176
This fear may have a foundation. Because of the way the Court struc-
tured the tests for coercion and for harmless error, it appears that a
confession extracted by police brutality could nevertheless be "harm-
less" if the other evidence could pass the Chapman test. Once the de-
termination of coercion has been made, the existence of brutality is
removed from consideration. The determination of harmless error has
nothing to do with how the confession is obtained. The Chapman test
examines the untainted evidence to' see if it can stand on its own.
Therefore, it is the strength of other evidence, not the egregiousness of
government conduct, that determines whether or not the defendant will
be retried. This structure does seem, at least in theory, to remove a
deterrent to police misconduct by making automatic reversal of a trial
more difficult.
Another prevalent view is that making automatic reversal more
difficult will result in justice being better served, with fewer of the
guilty being freed on technicalities. 77 However, Fulminante illustrates
175. II1 S. Ct. at 1258-61.
176. For the argument that this decision will seriously impede due process for the criminally
accused, see A Supreme Court Retreat, THE WASH. POST, March 29, 1991, at A20, col. _; The
Supreme Court's Harmful Error, THE N.Y. TiMES, March 29, 1991, at A22, col. 1; Justices Open
Pandora's Box; Out Comes the 'Harmless' Forced Confession, L.A. TIMES, March 28, 1991, at
B6, col. 1. See also Samuel Pillsbury, Perspective on the Supreme Court: The Fifth Amendment
Takes Another Blow, LA. TIMES, March 29, 1991, at B7, col. 1. (Samuel Pillsbury is a professor
at Loyola Law School).
177. Two prominent proponents of the justice argument are Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Arizona's Supreme Court Justice Cameron. They argue that harmless error analysis can bring
fairness to cases where coercion is minimal. In Fulminante Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized
that he could see no reason for treating a confession violating the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
differently than one violating the Sixth Amendment, especially when the coercion did not involve
police violence. I I I S. Ct. at 1266 (emphasis added). Justice Cameron expressed the same view
when he dissented in the Arizona Supreme Court's second opinion. 778 P.2d at 633.
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that a person who is guilty of a heinous crime and succumbs to mini-
mal "coercion" could nevertheless escape through the harmless error
loophole if the untainted evidence were impeachable. Therefore, the
question arises: Could luck rather than justice prevail under an analysis
based on Fulminante?
The final question is whether Fulminante opens the door for other
constitutional violations to be considered "harmless." The majority
opinion put great emphasis on the types of errors that could be harm-
less and seemed to leave violationethat it deemed basic to a fair trial in
the automatic reversal category. 7 8 Great stress was placed on the
strength of the other evidence against a defendant.1 79 Using this em-
phasis, one could rationalize the adoption of harmless error to other
constitutional violations. 8' One could conclude that the strength of evi-
dence against a defendant makes an error harmless regardless of the
nature of the error. Thus, although the door is probably not wide open
to the adoption of harmless error to all violations, it may indeed be
"cracked." The possibility of "structural defects" slipping through such
a crack could logically exist with such a heavy emphasis being placed
on evidence. After Fulminante, the "constitutional sneak thief'1 81
could conceivably strike again.
Lynne Trulock Ravellette
Justice Cameron would like to eliminate automatic reversal altogether and replace it with a
test similar to the familiar "Hand formula" for negligence. 'For the "Hand formula" see United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In determining whether a case should
be reversed, Justice Cameron would balance the gravity of the government misconduct with the
gravity of the crime in a particular case. His thesis is that automatic reversal's alleged benefits
(deterrence of police misconduct and preservation of judicial integrity) have been outweighed by
its costs to society (freeing the guilty, diversion of the fact-finding process from the truth, and
damaging the law). See generally J. Cameron & R. Lustiger, 101 F.R.D. 109 (1984). Justice
Cameron stated in State v. Fulminante that the harmless error rule was a good alternative to the
balancing approach. He argued that it would accomplish the same result-keeping guilty defend-.
ants from being freed on technicalities. 778 P.2d at 634 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
178. 11I S. Ct. at 1264-66.
179. Id. at 1265.
180. The dissent in Fulminante pointed out that these constitutional violations are presently
immune to harmless error, regardless of the strength of evidence against a defendant--directed
verdict, absence of counsel at trial, and denial of a public trial. Id. at 1256-57. It could be argued
that the ability of the evidence to stand alone renders any of these errors "harmless." As Justice
White stated, "[the value of these guarantees] may be intangible and unprovable in any case." Id.
at 1257. The step from rationalizing the "harmlessness" of a coerced confession to rendering these
violations harmless does not appear to be a big one if the truth-seeking function is allowed to
eclipse the underlying constitutional protection.
181. Goldberg, supra note 61, at 442. See supra note 100.
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